Abstract -This paper uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to explore the role of differences in supply shifts in explaining cross-national differences in the rise in earnings inequality. Changes in returns to age and education are estimated for eight countries using a common specification of earnings functions across years and countries. We find that the small overall increase in earnings inequality in many countries reflects large but offsetting changes in returns to skill and changes in inequality within age education cells. Furthermore, these differences in returns to skill can largely be explained by differences in supply shifts.
I. Introduction
A VAST literature, reviewed in Levy and Murnane (1992) and Gottschalk (1997) , has documented the substantial increases in the inequality of wage rates and annual earnings in the United States during the 1980s and early 1990s. A growing literature on changes in earnings inequality in other industrialized countries reviewed in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) indicates that the United States is not unique in experiencing an increase in inequality. However, while inequality grew in most other countries, only the UK experienced as large an increase as the United States. Furthermore, the countries that experienced little or no increase in earnings inequality all had some form of centralized wage setting. For example, in Finland, Sweden, and Germany associations of employers and employees negotiate at the national level to set the broad structure in which wages are set at lower levels. This has led to the working hypothesis that these wage setting institutions were the primary factor limiting the growth in earnings inequality in these countries. 1 This paper shifts the focus to market-based explanations for the diversity of experiences across countries. It explores the extent to which changes in relative factor supplies are able to explain differences across countries in the change in returns to observable indicators of skill. Using a unique data set we estimate changes in returns to age and education (or occupation) in eight OECD countries using a common statistical framework in all countries. This allows us to go behind the overall changes in earnings inequality to see whether the small growth in inequality in some countries reflects small increases in differentials between groups and small increases in inequality within groups or whether the small net increases noted in the previous literature are the result of large offsetting changes in different components. We then explore whether changes in relative supplies are consistent with changes in returns to observed skills.
Our objective is not to pit institutional explanations against market explanations, since we believe that both matter. Rather our aim is to distinguish between countries where institutional forces were placing binding constraints on wage changes from those countries where market forces were primarily responsible for moderating the rise in inequality. 2 The paper is divided into five parts. The next section reviews the literature on cross-national comparisons of inequality. Section III uses the data sets in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to measure changes in overall inequality and changes in inequality between and within age and education or occupation groups. We include three countries that have received little previous attention (Israel, the Netherlands, and Finland) and several countries that have been analyzed previously with different data sets and a variety of methods (Australia, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). In Section IV we examine the relationship between changes in relative supplies of more educated or older workers and changes in the return to education and age to see whether market forces are consistent with the limited increase in inequality even in countries with centralized wage setting. The final section explores the relationship between changes in relative unemployment rates and changes in relative wages to see whether this evidence on quantities is consistent with the hypothesis that constraints were limiting wages from falling to their market clearing levels.
II. Review of Literature

A. U.S. Experience
Rising earnings and wage inequality in the United States has led to a substantial literature documenting the trends and attempting to identify the causes of the rising inequality. 3 Received for publication December 14, 1992 . Revision accepted for publication December 4, 1997.
* Boston College; and Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively. The views expressed are not attributable to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We would like to thank Tim Smeeding and Lee Rainwater for the years of work it has taken to put the LIS data sets together.
1 For a discussion of the role of institutions in limiting the rise in wage inequality see Freeman and Katz (1994) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997) .
Changes in the dispersion of the overall earnings distribution can be usefully decomposed into changes in between-group inequality and within-group inequality. The former inequality focuses on changes in differentials between education groups and between experience groups. Within-group inequality focuses on changes in earnings dispersion within education and experience groups.
Almost all studies of the United States use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to examine the distribution of weekly or annual earnings for males, working full-time and full-year. 4 These studies find that earnings growth varied dramatically between the upper and lower parts of the distribution. For example, Gottschalk (1997) shows that the real weekly wages of males at the 10th percentile were nearly 30% lower in 1994 than two decades earlier. In contrast males at the 90th percentile in 1994 had real weekly wages that were 15% higher than those of their counterparts in 1973. This pattern of larger increases (or smaller decreases) for persons higher in the distribution holds as well for other percentile points. For women there is also a sharp increase in overall inequality, which, however, starts somewhat later than for men.
Part of the observed change in the overall distribution reflects the large increase in the returns to education during the 1980s. This is in sharp contrast to the decline in the returns to education during the 1970s. 5 The returns to experience also increased, especially among the less educated. 6 The result of these trends has been a dramatic decline in the relative position of young high-school graduates and high-school dropouts. Juhn et al. (1993) illustrate this decline by noting that real earnings at the 10th percentile of high-school graduates with 1 to 10 years of experience were roughly 15% lower in 1989 than earnings for the same group in 1963, a quarter of a century earlier. The earnings of the least skilled workers were rapidly falling away from the rest of the distribution.
In addition to the increased inequality between education and experience groups, recent studies find a large increase in the dispersion of log earnings within skill groups. The increase in within-group inequality, however, seems to have started earlier, beginning in the early 1970s. The earnings differential between the 90th and the 10th percentiles has increased within the distribution of earnings of young and old workers and within the earnings distribution of highschool and college graduates. Persons in the upper part of the conditional distribution have experienced significant growth in real earnings whereas those in the lower part experienced slight growth or actual declines in real earnings.
B. International Experience
The recent availability of cross-national data has spawned a growing literature, reviewed in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) , on levels and trends in earnings inequality in OECD countries. Most studies provide detailed information on one country or pairwise comparisons with the United States. For example, Freeman and Needels (1993) compare the United States with Canada; Katz et al. (1994) compare the United States with the United Kingdom, Japan, and France; Katz and Revenga (1989) compare the United States and Japan; whereas Abraham and Houseman (1994) contrast the United States with West Germany. Country-specific studies of overall changes in inequality are now available for many other countries. For example, Borland and Wilkins (1996) and Gregory (1993) present data on Australia; Gustafsson and Palmer (1997) , Hibbs (1990) , and Edin and Holmlund (1992) on Sweden; Hartog et al. (1993) on the Netherlands; and Schmitt (1992) on the United Kingdom.
The broad consensus emerging out of this literature is that while almost all countries experienced some increase in earnings inequality, the United States was unusual in the magnitude of the rise in overall inequality and increases in returns to education. Only the United Kingdom experienced an increase in overall inequality as large as the United States. Furthermore, countries that experienced the smallest increase in overall earnings inequality (Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and France) all had more centralized labor markets than countries experiencing large increases in inequality (Canada, United States, and United Kingdom). 7 This has led to the working hypothesis that these institutional constraints were largely responsible for the lack of significant increase in inequality in these countries.
The implicit assumption behind this hypothesis is that the institutional constraints were binding. While the existence of institutions may give these countries the potential for limiting wage declines for less skilled workers, market forces, such as a decrease in the relative supply of less skilled workers, may be responsible for limiting the downward pressure on wages of less skilled workers in some of these countries. The relative importance of these two forces is an empirical questions, which we explore in section IV.
III. Patterns of Changes in Inequality
In order to assess the impact of market forces on changes in inequality by skill group we first estimate changes in returns to observable skills in each country. These are then compared to changes in relative supplies of different skill groups.
Cross-national comparisons of returns to observed skills require that we estimate earnings functions in a variety of countries using similar techniques and data that are compa-4 For recent studies using the Current Population Surveys see Juhn et al. (1993) , Karoly (1993), and Gottschalk (1997) . Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) find similar trends in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
5 See Freeman (1976) . 6 MaCurdy and Morz (1996) find that the increase in returns to experience in a cross section reflects shifts in cohort profiles. 7 Blau and Kahn (1994) also examine the relationship between inequality and the degree of wage centralization. They, however, focus on differences in inequality across countries at a moment in time rather than on the relationship between institutional constraints and the rise in inequality.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS rable across countries. Existing cross-national studies have largely focused on a single country or made pairwise comparisons with the United States. These studies used selection criteria and data definitions that were most appropriate for their country. Definitions and data were, however, not designed to be consistent across studies. Therefore, at best they yield high quality data on pairwise comparisons with the United States but relatively little information that would allow comparisons across a wide variety of countries, for example, between Sweden and the United Kingdom. This problem is particularly severe when trying to compare changes in returns to skill across a wide variety of countries.
A. Data Source and Sample Definitions
We use a data source, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), that was created specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS data are a collection of micro data sets obtained from annual income surveys in various countries. 8 The surveys are similar in form to the Current Population Survey for the United States or the Survey of Consumer Finances for Canada. 9 The advantage of these data is that extensive effort has been made by country specialists to render information on income sources and household characteristics as comparable as possible across a large number of countries. While our discussion will point out remaining issues of comparability in the LIS, our judgment is that these differences are small relative to differences across studies that are not designed to be comparable. A further advantage of the LIS is that it offers the only publicly available micro data sets for the Netherlands and Israel. 10 The availability of micro data allows us to estimate a consistent set of earnings functions in a wide variety of countries.
While our data overcome some problems of comparability, they are by no means perfect. Since the underlying data sets were originally designed in different countries for a variety of purposes, they clearly depart from the ideal of a single survey instrument applied to all countries. 11 Attempts to make these data sets comparable has costs as well as benefits. The major cost is that we are forced to use the lowest common denominator in defining variables and samples. For example, we are limited to the earnings of heads of households since the earnings of other individuals are not available in all years. 12 The advantage is, however, that the data definitions that have been used facilitate comparisons across countries.
Since we are interested in changes in inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s, we are restricted to the countries with at least 2 years of data in the LIS during this period. The LIS includes 3 years of data on Australia, Israel, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It contains 2 years of data for Canada, Finland, and the Netherlands. 13 Although the years used were dictated by the availability of data for each country in the LIS, most countries cover the 1980s and early 1990s. The exceptions are Canada and Finland, for which we have data for 1987 and 1991 only.
Our measure of earnings is real annual gross wages and salaries. In order to restrict the sample to people who are not likely to be in school or retired, we limit our sample to male heads between the ages of 25 and 54. 14 We use the earnings of male heads, rather than all males since data on individuals who are not heads or spouses are not available in the LIS for the years we use. We focus on males because the distribution of the earnings of females was affected by selection (which women entered the labor force) as well as by changes in supply and demand for women with given characteristics. Focusing on males partially avoids these selection issues. The need to restrict the sample to male heads is a limitation of these data, but studies using the CPS data have found similar patterns of earnings inequality whether using heads or all individuals. 15 To be consistent with other studies, we also limit the sample to full-time workers whose earnings reflect changes in wages rather than changes in hours. 16 Finally, in order to exclude potential returns to capital we exclude male heads of households who were self-employed. 17 To maintain confidentiality some countries recode earnings above some upper bound. 18 For example, in recent years the U.S. data are top-coded at $199,000. This top coding affects comparisons both across time and across countries. 19 We use two different methods to account for the effects of top coding. The first is to use summary measures, 8 See Smeeding et al. (1990) for a detailed description of the data source and methods for accessing the data.
9 Appendix A lists the surveys used in each country. 10 LIS also includes two years of data on France but these data sets do not include a variable that would allow us to identify full-time workers, as required in our analysis.
11 The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) asks similar questions in different countries. However, most countries provide earnings only in bracketed amounts that differ both across time and countries. As a result the earnings data do not replicate the patterns from larger data sets that provide nonbracketed amounts from larger samples. For example, the ISSP data for the United States does not show the upward trend in inequality found in the CPS and other data sets.
12 Recent data for some countries includes earnings of nonheads. Our focus on changes in earnings inequality, however, requires at least two years of data for each country. 13 We did not use the 1981 data for Canada since it is impossible to impose the same full-time cut as in the later years. The German data in the LIS were not used because the 1981 and 1984 data were obtained from two different surveys, the German Transfer Survey and the German Socioeconomic Panel. All other countries had data from the same surveys in all years.
14 This includes single males who are the head of their own households. 15 See Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) . 16 We recognize that the selection of full-time workers also introduces selection issues, though there has been relatively little change in part-time work among male heads, at least in the United States. Furthermore, trends in wage rates of all workers closely mirror the trends in earnings of full-time workers in the United States. The Australian and Netherlands data are for full-time last week rather than full-time in the reference year. 17 The self-employed variable is not available in Australia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
18 Earnings over this amount are coded at the top of the interval. 19 Even if the nominal upper bound does not change, inflation erodes the real value.
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN RISE IN EARNINGS INEQUALITY
such as percentile points, that are not affected by top coding. The second method, which we use when calculating the coefficient of variation, is to measure the dispersion of the truncated distribution by excluding the top 5% of the distribution in each year. By providing a consistent cutoffs across time and countries we limit the effects of top coding. 20 Thus the data we present on the changes in the coefficient of variation are for changes in the distribution of earnings truncated at the 95th percentile in each country. Percentile points and other measures not affected by top coding are for the full distribution.
To explore changes both between and within education groups, we construct four education categories corresponding in the United States to less than 12 years of education, 12 years, 13 to 15 years, and 16 or more years. The recoding into these groups is straightforward in countries where the education variable represents years of schooling (i.e., Canada, Finland, and Israel) and somewhat more subjective for countries where the education variable is already grouped (i.e., the Netherlands). 21 Since no education information is available for Sweden or the United Kingdom, we follow Katz et al. (1994) by looking at returns to broad occupations rather than education. We construct three occupation groups, corresponding roughly to professional and managerial workers, blue-collar workers, and a residual category which includes lower level white-collar workers.
B. Changes in Earnings Inequality
In this section we present data on changes in annual earnings inequality for our eight countries. We first present cross-national comparisons of changes in the overall earnings distribution. Where possible this allows us to benchmark our data against previous studies. We then present new estimates of changes in between-group inequality based on earnings functions that can be compared across countries. Table 1 documents changes in overall inequality in each country using two different measures. The first panel presents the coefficient of variation of the truncated distribution of earnings for each country in each year (column 1) along with the yearly absolute change (column 2) and relative change (column 3). 22 While the coefficient of variation gives an overall summary measure of inequality, it does not show whether the increase in inequality is coming from a decline at the bottom or an increase in earnings at the top of the distribution. The next two panels in table 1, therefore, present changes in the earnings of persons at the 10th and 90th percentiles, measured as log deviations from median earnings. The rightmost panel presents the resulting change in the log deviation between the 90th and 10th percentiles. 23 Absolute changes in ln P 90 /P 10 are plotted in figure 1.
Changes in the Overall Distributions:
While changes in the coefficient of variation and the P 90 /P 10 give somewhat different rankings, the pattern of smaller increases in countries with more centralized labor markets is clear. Based on changes in the P 90 /P 10 the countries break down into three broad groups. The United States and the United Kingdom are at one end and Sweden and Finland at the other. Consistent with many other studies 20 An alternative would be to impute values to persons who are top coded. This has the advantage of maintaining information on all persons with valid data but the disadvantage of introducing substantial measurement error, which may have a large effect on second moments. 21 We follow the educational recoding in O'Conner (1994). 22 Yearly changes are shown since the number of years between surveys in the LIS varies across countries. We show both absolute and relative changes since the bases differ across countries.
23 Gottschalk (1997) shows that changes in the 10th and 90th percentiles are representative of broader changes in the earnings distribution in the United States since changes in earnings are monotonically increasing in the initial percentile. 24 Furthermore, where the United States stands out is the 3.1% per year decline in the P 10 /P 50 between 1986 and 1991. The next largest yearly decline at the bottom of the distribution is 1.5% per year in Canada. While the increase in inequality in the United Kingdom partially reflects the increase in unemployment rates between the two years of data we have in the LIS, the upward trend net of cycle in inequality in the United Kingdom is well documented in the literature. For the United States inequality increased both between two years of roughly similar unemployment (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) and two years when unemployment rose (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) . 25 Australia, Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands form a middle group of countries which experienced increases in inequality, but less than the United States or the United Kingdom. Both the coefficient of variation and the P 90 /P 10 increased moderately in Australia and the Netherlands. However, these two measures show somewhat conflicting patterns in Israel and Canada. For Israel the early period shows a large increase in the coefficient of variation compared to the P 90 /P 10 . This reflects very modest declines at the bottom but substantial increases at the top. 26 For Canada the increase in the P 90 /P 10 is roughly as large as in the United Kingdom, but the change in the coefficient of variation is considerably smaller. In Australia and the Netherlands, the 10th percentile lost relative to the median by a similar magnitude as the 90th percentile gained relative to the median. 27 24 Schmitt (1992) finds an increase in overall dispersion in weekly earnings using data from the British General Household Survey. Katz et al. (1994) also find strong similarities in the pattern of increased wage inequality in the United States and United Kingdom using gross hourly earnings from the New Earnings Survey. We take this as confirmation that the limits imposed by the LIS do not lead to substantively different conclusions. 25 There is, in fact, little correlation between changes in unemployment rates and changes in inequality over the periods covered by the LIS. The correlation between the yearly change in unemployment (from appendix B) and the change in the P 90 /P 10 (from table 1) is only 0.17. 26 While there are no studies of changes in earnings inequality among males in Israel, Achdut (1995) , using a different data set, finds increases in the Gini coefficient for all family heads that are roughly proportional to the increases in the coefficient of variation for the earnings of male heads in table 1. 27 Borland and Wilkins (1996) find similar increases in inequality in Australia using both data from the ABS Labour Force Survey and data from the Income Distribution Survey. Hartog et al. (1993, Sweden and Finland form a third group with Sweden experiencing a small increase in inequality in both periods covered and Finland experiencing an equally modest decline in inequality during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This reduction in inequality is a result of equal growth in earnings at the 90th and 50th percentiles but a slightly faster growth at the 10th percentile. 28 The ability of these two countries to provide information on the Netherlands based on cross tabulations provided by the Central Planning Bureau and several small micro data sets. They find almost no change in inequality between 1979 and 1989. 28 Edin and Holmlund (1992) , Hibbs (1990) , and Gustafsson and Palmer (1997) report small increases in earnings inequality in Sweden using alternative micro data sets and tabulations from associations of employers and trade unions. Edin and Holmlund use the Level of Living Survey Notes: Equations also include race dummies specific to each country, marital status and number of children under 18. Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent (***) levels.
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stem the increase in inequality in spite of cyclical downturns during the early 1990s is particularly remarkable. In summary, these overall changes in earnings inequality indicate that the LIS data sets are largely consistent with previous country specific studies. Furthermore, the correspondence between the degree of centralization of labor markets and the growth in inequality is born out in our data, including the new countries we have added to the literature. The five countries with the smallest increases in inequality all have some form of coordinated wage setting which may potentially limit market forces. 29 In Finland wages are set through coordinated wage bargains between employers' organizations and central trade unions. The bargained wages apply to all workers, even if they are not union members. Likewise, collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in Israel by a trade union (the Histadrut) that includes roughly three-quarters of all wage earners, but these agreements are usually legally binding on the full labor force. Australia's accord between the government and trade unions allows unions to coordinate and centralize wage setting. This agreement, enacted in the early 1980s, had the potential of limiting shifts in the distribution of earnings during the period we cover, as well as limiting inflationary pressures. In Sweden wage setting is coordinated through industry-wide bargaining between employers' councils and unions. Similarly, unions bargain with employers' organizations in the Netherlands. Even though union membership is only about 25%, the agreements are applied to nearly 80% of the work force.
Changes in Returns to Observable Skills:
In this section we exploit the availability of micro data for a large number of countries in the LIS to see whether the changes in inequality documented in the previous section reflect changes in between group inequality. Did countries experiencing small increases in overall inequality also experience little change in returns to observable skills? Or was the small net change a result of increases in inequality of some components offset by decreases in other components? To answer these questions we estimate standard log earnings regressions to obtain estimates of the education and age premiums, as well as the variance of earnings within these groups, in each country in each year for which we have data.
The equations we estimate include either a set of education or occupation dummies. The education dummies correspond as closely as possible to less than high school, high school (the excluded group), some college, and four or more years of college. 30 For Sweden and the United Kingdom, which do not provide data on educational level, we include occupational dummies that roughly correspond to managerial or professional workers, blue-collar workers, and a residual category which is typically other white-collar workers (the excluded group). 31 We present estimates using both a quadratic in age and a set of age dummies that correspond to the age categories we will use in the next section to measure changes in relative supplies by age group. The latter allows us to match increases in age premia to the corresponding change in factor supply. In addition to these variables we also include dummies for race categories identified in each country survey, marital status, and number of children under 18.
The first six panels of table 2 show estimated coefficients in each year under our two specifications.
Comparison (LNU) and the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey (HUS). Hibbs uses tabulations of data provided by the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish Confederation of Employers (SAF). Eriksson and Jantti (1995) find a small increase in inequality for
Finland between 1985 and 1990, but this follows a sharp decline during the 1970s and early 1980s. 29 The fact that increases in inequality are similar in the two periods we have for Australia, Israel, and Sweden in spite of large changes in unemployment during these periods, also indicates that changes in inequality are more country specific than cyclical. 30 The recoded categories follow O'Conner (1994) and are available from the authors.
31 Katz et al. (1994) also use occupations to measure changes in returns to observable skills. Juhn (1994) shows that occupational differentials also increased in the United States. Notes: Equations also include race dummies specific to each country, marital status and number of children under 18. Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**) and 1 percent (***) levels.
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across columns indicates that equations with the quadratic in age and those with the age dummies give similar returns to education (or occupation).
Column 1 of table 3 ranks countries according to the yearly change in education or occupation premia in each subperiod. 32 We will return later to column 2, which shows the change in the educational premium after controlling for changes in relative supply. The change in the education premium in the United States between 1979 and 1986 is clearly the largest increase across all countries and time periods. In 1979 full-time workers with at least a college degree earned 29% more than high-school graduates of the same age (see table 2 ). This differential rose to 40% by 1986. The result was a 1.6% per year increase in the college premium. The second largest increase is also for the United States (1.1% per year between 1986 and 1991), but it is closely followed by a large number of countries, including Sweden (for the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] and Finland, two countries that had the smallest overall increases in inequality.
While the United States was both at the top of the distribution of changes in overall inequality and changes in returns to education, there is little correspondence between these two outcomes for the remaining countries. The United Kingdom, which experienced almost as large an increase in overall inequality as the United States, had only a moderate increase in the occupational premium. Likewise, the Netherlands and Australia had similar increases in overall inequality, but Australia had moderate increases in the returns to education while the Netherlands experienced a dramatic decline in this premium. 33 Finland, which had an actual decline in overall inequality, experienced a moderately large increase in the returns to college. Clearly for some countries the stability of the overall distribution of earnings was a result of offsetting changes in inequality between and within groups.
The nature of the offsetting changes is clearly seen in table 4, which shows the change in the log earnings differential between persons 45 to 54 and persons 25 to 34. Again most countries experienced an increase in the age premium, but in this case the United States and United Kingdom did not experience the largest increases. Instead, Israel (for the early period) and the Netherlands lead the pack. The 2.4% per year increase in the age premia in the Netherlands almost fully offset the 2.6% decline in the returns to college, shown in table 3. Likewise the small declines in the age premium in Canada and Finland served to offset part of the increase in their education premia. Sweden is the only country to experience small increases in the education and age premia as well as in overall inequality, and this is only true in the period covering the late 1980s.
While we are primarily interested in changes in returns to observable characteristics which can be compared to changes in factor supplies to see if changes in market forces are consistent with the observed changes in returns to skill, it is worth noting that changes in within-group inequality also varied widely across countries. Furthermore, there is no clear relationship between the ranking of countries in changes in overall inequality and changes in within-group inequality. For example, the increase in earnings inequality between 1987 and 1992 in Sweden was one of the smallest shown in table 1. The increase in within-group inequality for Sweden, whether measured by the yearly change in the residual variance (shown in table 2) or by the P 90 /P 10 of residuals, was one of the largest increases across all countries and time periods covered in this study. 34 In contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom were neither consistently high nor low in the growth in within-group inequality. 32 The education premium is the log differential between college and high-school graduates, given by the coefficient on college. The occupation premium is the log differential between managerial and professional and other white collar. Changes in coefficients are divided by the number of years between the two data sets to obtain changes per year. 33 The decline in returns to education in this period is consistent with evidence in Hartog et al. (1993) . 34 Since the residuals are from log earnings equations, the variance of the residuals is sensitive to low conditional earnings. We therefore also examined the P 90 /P 10 of residuals which is not sensitive to extreme low values. Rankings for these two measures were substantially different, but neither ranking resembled the ranking in figure 1. Figure 2 .
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In summary, we have shown that countries that avoided large increases in overall inequality did not always fare as well when we look at individual components. For many of these countries the small increases in overall inequality mask offsetting changes in the education (or occupation) premium, the age premium or inequality within groups. The Netherlands is the prime example. Its small increase in overall inequality is a result of a large decline in the college premium matched by an increase in the premium paid to older workers. For Finland the pattern is reversed. The decline in overall inequality in Finland during the late 1980s was accompanied by an increase in the college premium almost as large as in the United States. The small decline in the age premium and a sufficiently large decline in inequality within groups served to offset this sharp increase in the college premium, leading to a net decline in overall earnings inequality.
The diversity in returns to observable skills we have documented in this section offers a new piece of evidence with which to gauge the relative importance of market forces in limiting the rise in inequality. If changes in the returns to skills are smaller in countries and time periods where the growth in the supply of skilled workers is relatively large, then this suggests that market forces may be partially responsible for the lack of an increase in overall inequality, even in countries with centralized wage setting institutions.
IV. Role of Changes in Factor Supply
We examine the relationship between changes in returns to observable skills documented in the previous section and increases in relative factor supplies under the maintained assumption that these OECD countries experienced similar changes in the structure of demand. Under this assumption (and the assumption of a common technology) it is straightforward to show that differences across countries in changes in relative factor prices are a negative function of the relative shifts in factor supplies. 35 Changes in factor supplies are calculated from the LIS for the same educational (or occupational) and age groups used to estimate changes in relative factor prices in the previous section. 36 In order to verify whether our estimates of changes in supply are affected by the limitations in both years and population covered in the LIS, we compared estimates of changes in relative factor supplies by age with published data from the International Labor Office (ILO) and by education from country-specific sources. Changes from these sources closely matched those in the LIS. Figure 2 plots the yearly change in the age premium from table 4 against the yearly change in the proportion of the work force aged 45 to 54. Increases in the premium paid to older workers were largest in countries in which older workers became relatively scarce. The previously noted large increase in the age premium in the Netherlands is seen to be consistent with a sharp decrease in the relative supply of older workers. Likewise, the decline in the relative supply of older workers in Israel between 1979 and 1986 is consistent with the large rise in the age premium. At the other extreme, the decline in the age premium in Finland, Canada, Australia (in the 1985 -1989 period), and Sweden (1981 -1987 are consistent with the large increases in the relative supply of older workers.
Shifts in supply go a long way toward explaining the diversity of experiences. Nearly half of the variance in changes in the age premium can be explained by the variance in changes in relative supply. 37 This is somewhat surprising given that the variables are in change form and that this is a cross-sectional relationship. Figure 2 can also be used to compare changes in the age premium over different time periods within the same country for those countries for which we have three years of data. While the small number of countries with three years of data precludes strong conclusions, it is reassuring to see that eliminating country specific effects by using only within country changes confirms the potential importance of supply shifts. For Israel the decline in the relative supply of older workers between 1979 and 1986 was reversed between 1986 and 1992. The resulting increase in the relative supply of older workers was matched by much smaller increases in the age premium. Similarly Australia went from having a shrinking pool of older workers to an expanding pool. During the early period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) the age premium rose, during the later period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) it fell. While the United States also experienced an increase in the growth rate of older workers, the dampening effect was smaller than for either Israel or Australia. The only country for which supply shifts are not sufficient to explain differences in the change in the age premium is Sweden, which experienced a decline in the premium between 1981 and 1987 but a substantial increase in the premium between 1987 and 1992 in spite of very similar growth in the relative supply of older workers in the two periods.
The data in figure 2 are consistent with a market-based explanation for differences in the rise in the age premium in most countries. It is, however, possible that institutional factors explain differences in the growth in the age premium, holding the change in labor supply constant. To explore this possibility column 2 of table 4 shows the yearly growth rates in the age premium, measured as a deviation from the fitted line in figure 2. These residuals show no clear pattern between the growth in the age premium and the type of labor market, even after having controlled for changes in relative 35 Changes in domestic supplies do not affect relative factor prices in a Heckscher-Olin model in which relative factor prices are set on the world market in the long run and factor prices are set by output prices. Baldwin and Cain (1997) find little support for this explanation of changes in education premia. They provide evidence of the importance of factor supplies during the early 1970s and mixed evidence for later periods. 36 We interpret these as estimates of shifts in supply under the maintained assumption that in the short run supply of education and age groups is inelastic. 37 The R 2 of the linear bivariate regression is 0.475.
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factor supplies. The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada experienced neither unusually high nor low changes in the age premium compared to countries with more centralized labor markets. Thus, after conditioning on changes in labor supply there is little evidence that countries with more regulated labor markets managed to limit the rise in the age premium.
Turning to changes in the education premium shows the same general patterns, though the evidence is somewhat weaker. Figure 3 plots changes in the educational (or occupational) premium and changes in the relative supply of the corresponding skill group for each country. The negative slope coefficient is nearly identical to the slope coefficient in figure 2, but the random variation across countries and time periods is larger (as indicated by the R 2 of 0.316, compared to 0.475 for figure 2). 38 Furthermore, the negative relationship is partially driven by the Netherlands, where a large increase in the supply of college educated workers was accompanied by a large decrease in the college premium. 39 However, the slope coefficient continues to be significantly negative even when the Netherlands is dropped.
Within-country differences across time also provide mixed support for the importance of changes in supply in determining changes in the education premium. In Israel the relative supply of college workers grew faster in the second period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) than in the first (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) . This is consistent with the sharp decline in the growth of the college premium between the two periods. However, the within country changes in the growth in the education premium in Australia and Sweden are not consistent with changes in their growths in factor supplies. Australia experienced a modest increase in the education premium and Sweden experienced a modest decline in the occupational premium, in spite of near constancy in the growth rate in factor supplies in both countries.
In summary, we find strong evidence that differences across countries in the growth of the age premium are associated with changes in relative factor supplies. One possible reason for the difference in the age and education results is that it is much more difficult to get measures of education that are consistent across countries. If this results in measurement error in the change in the education premium but not in the change in factor supply then the slope coefficient will not be bias but the R 2 will be lower. 39 The slope coefficient is only a third as large when the Netherlands is excluded. THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS tries which experienced larger increases in the supply of college educated workers also experienced smaller increases in the education premium, though the relationship is not as strong.
V. Changes in Relative Unemployment Rates
In this section we shift focus from changes in relative prices to changes in relative unemployment, as an indicator of potential disequilibrium. So far we have ignored changes in unemployment rates of less skilled workers as a potential additional source of information on the role of institutional constraints on wage adjustments. 40 Consider a simple supply and demand model in which structural unemployment reflects labor market rigidities. In such a world, a downward shift in demand for less skilled workers, unmatched by an equal downward shift in supply, would result in an increase in the relative unemployment rates of less skilled workers. Therefore, if labor market institutions kept wages from falling to their market clearing levels and if the excess supply of workers continued to search for jobs, then relative unemployment rates of less skilled workers would rise when the decline in demand for their skills was greater than the decrease in supply. Empirically this implies that relative unemployment rates of less skilled workers would increase more in countries which experienced smaller wage declines, conditional on exogenous changes in labor supply. 41 Note that the focus of this argument is on relative unemployment rates, not the absolute level of unemployment rates. 42 As long as the demand for higher skilled 41 The following simple model shows the relationship between exogenous limits on relative wage adjustment, as captured by r, and endogenous changes in relative unemployment in a simple linear supply and demand model. The change in relative demand in country c is given by an exogenous shock common to all countries, D x , and a demand response to the change in the relative wage in country c, W c : (1) dD c ϭ dD x ϩ ␣dW c Changes in relative supply are given by (2) dS c ϭ dS xc ϩ ␤dW c where S xc is an exogenous shift in supply in country c. The observed change in relative wages is equal to the change in equilibrium wages minus r c , whose size depends on institutional constraints. (3) dw c ϭ 5(dD x Ϫ dS xc )/(␣ Ϫ ␤)6 Ϫ r c . The exogenous change in unemployment rate, defined as the difference between the change in demand and supply, therefore, depends on the exogenous r c : (4) dU c ϭ dD c Ϫ dS c ϭ (␣ Ϫ ␤)r c 42 The absolute level of unemployment rates in OECD countries vary both across countries and across time for a variety of reasons discussed in Bean (1994) . For a discussion of the impact of institutions on relative workers increases, their unemployment rates will fall relative to the unemployment rates of less skilled workers. Therefore, for countries such as Finland, which experienced small increases (or actual decreases) in both the observed age premium and the age premium conditional on changes in the relative supply by age group, we would expect an increase in the relative unemployment rate of the young.
Since the LIS files do not provide employment status we must use an outside source to obtain unemployment rates for the skill groups used in this paper. While the OECD provides unemployment rates by age, no data set provides consistently coded unemployment rates by education. This undoubtedly reflects the inherent difficulty of comparing education categories across countries. Table 5 provides two measures of the change in relative unemployment of persons 25 to 34 based on OECD data. 43 Column 1 shows the yearly change in the relative unemployment rates between the two LIS years. 44 Column 2 shows the annual growth rate from a linear time trend fit to the relative unemployment rates during each period covered in each country. For example, 0.002 is the slope of a linear time trend fit to the five years of data on relative unemployment rates of 25-to 34-year-olds for Australia between 1985 and 1989.
While we have shown that changes in market forces are closely correlated with cross-national differences in the growth in the age and education premia, the changes in relative unemployment rates shown in table 5 are consistent with binding institutional constraints in some countries. During the 1981-1987 period Sweden had the smallest absolute increase in the age premium, whether or not one controls for changes in relative supply. It also experienced the largest increase in the relative unemployment rates of the young, shown in table 5. 45 Likewise, Finland experienced the third largest increase in relative unemployment rates, which is consistent with its small increase in age premium compared to other countries with similar changes in relative supply. 46 Thus while we emphasize the importance of changes in relative supplies, we believe this evidence on changes in relative unemployment rates is consistent with explanations which include institutional as well as market factors.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence from a unique data source that allows comparisons of changes in the age and education premium as well as overall inequality across a number of countries. The data presented in the first section confirm that the United States was not unique in experiencing an increase in inequality of labor market income. However, it was the only country to experience large increases in inequality between both education and age groups and within each of these groups. Other countries either had small or offsetting changes in these sources of increased inequality. As a result, many experienced much smaller increases in overall inequality.
We exploit differences in estimated changes in returns to age and education (or occupation) to explore the hypothesis that changes in relative supplies may explain some of the diversity in experiences that have been attributed to differences in institutional constraints. We find that when attention is focused on changes in returns to skills rather than changes in overall inequality, the relationship between institutional constraints and distributional measures starts to break down. For example, the small increase in overall inequality in the Netherlands is the result of large increases in the age premium which are offset by large declines in the education premium. This suggests that differences in market forces may be responsible for at least part of these changes. This is confirmed in our finding that larger changes in relative labor supply of older workers are associated with smaller increases in the age premium. Similarly, increases in the education premium are negatively associated with increases in the relative supply of more educated workers, though the relationship is somewhat weaker.
We then turn to changes in relative unemployment rates under the assumption that if the effects of changes in market forces were being limited by institutional constraints then this might result in increases in the relative unemployment rates of the young. The evidence for Sweden and Finland suggests that their small increase in the age premium may versus absolute levels of unemployment see Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) . 43 The underlying OECD data are in appendix B. Table 5 presents unemployment rates of 25-to 34-year-olds relative to the unemployment rates of all persons 25 to 54 rather than relative to the unemployment rates of persons 45 to 54 since the latter were small and unstable in several countries. The conclusions are, however, consistent with either series. 44 The changes are expressed in change per year to make these figures comparable to the change in the age premium, which is also adjusted for the number of intervening years. 45 These changes in relative unemployment rates may understate the rise in the proportion of young men not finding unsubsidized jobs since the Swedish government has a fairly large Works Projects program that provides employment to the long-term unemployed. 46 Australia, however, does not fit the pattern. The changes in the age premium would suggest that institutional constraints were keeping the age premium from rising but Australia experienced the smallest rise in the relative unemployment among all countries in table 5. 
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well reflect some institutional constraints on market forces. In summary, we find evidence that market forces can be used to explain much of the cross-national differences that have been attributed in the literature to differences in labor market institutions. This does not mean that institutional constraints are never binding, only that they may not be binding if there are sufficiently large supply shifts to offset the demand shifts. We, in fact provide some evidence that the changes in relative unemployment rates in Sweden and Finland are consistent with institutional constraints limiting the decline in the age premium for these two countries.
The broad conclusion we draw from the evidence in this paper is that market forces matter more in explaining cross-national differences in inequality than the existing literature suggests. This, of course, does not mean that institutional explanations do not matter but that the presumption should not be that they always provide binding constraints. 
